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CLARK BYsv*
The adoption of the Twenty-first Amendment on December 5, x933 terminated
the experiment in national prohibition and established a new liquor control policy
within the framework of which federal and state governments were to regulate the
manufacture, distribution, and sale of intoxicating beverages. Post-Repeal liquor con-
trol legislation followed no uniform pattern; the states utilized the control systems of
prohibition, state monopoly, and licensing, while the Federal Government established
the Federal Alcohol Administration to regulate phases of the liquor traffic that could
not be controlled effectively by the states. Legislators seeking to incorporate into
those systems the most effective control devices and to avoid the errors of the past
looked to the rich history of previous legislative attempts to cope with the liquor
problem. The purpose of this paper will be to sketch the salient features of pre-
Repeal control systems and to suggest briefly the meaningful lessons that may be
learned from the history of American liquor control before Repeal.
CONTROL OV RETAILERs oF ALCOHOLIC Bzvpaoms 1
American legislative attempts to regulate the retail trade in alcoholic beverages
have almost invariably been based upon a system of licensing. Patterned after con-
temporaneous English liquor regulation, colonial control legislation generally re-
quired retail liquor sellers to secure licenses.2 Colonial legislatures sometimes granted
licenses, but usually this power was delegated to the governor, lieutenant governor,
local courts, or town councils 3 In some colonies, the number of licenses that could
* B.E., 1935, State Teachers College, Oshkosh, Wisconsin; LL.B., 1938, University of Wisconsin; LL.M.,
1939, Columbia University. Assistant Professor of Law, University of Iowa College of Law.
'There were two classes of liquor retailers: (r) those who sold for on-premise consumption, proprietors
of taverns and saloons; (2) those who sold for off-premise consumption, usually grocers and druggists. This
section of the paper will emphasize the former because (I) colonial and state legislation detailedly regulated
their sales and practices, while off-premise vendors were comparatively unrestricted, and (2) sales for
on-premise consumption constituted a much graver threat to the welfare of society than did sales for
off-premise consumption.
'On the English experience, see WEBB, TsE HisTORy os LIQuoR LICENSING IN ENGLAND (1903) 1-48;
Porritt, Five Centuries of Liquor Legislation in England (1895) 1o POL. Sc. Q. 615.
'1 DEL. LAws (1700-1792) 193 (governor); PA. AcTs (1775) 59, passed in 1710 (lieutenant governor)
[the gubernatorial licensing power was only nominal, licenses being issued as a matter of course to those
applicants who were recommended by the local court. See Ssrzs, CENTRALIZED ADMNIsTEATI o oil LIQUOR
LAws (899) 36-38]; N. C. Laws 1741, c. 20, §4 (court); R. I. Acts 1711, 11 (town council). In
Massachusetts, the General Court licensed public houses until 1644. Kaotrr, THt ORIGtNs or PRouatnoN
(1925) 8, n. 22.
This compilation is of course not exhaustive. It is sufficient for a study of this nature to cite illustrative
instances; that procedure has been followed in this footnote and it will be adhered r in subsequent citations.
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be issued in certain counties, towns, or municipalities was established by statute.4 In
others, where no limit was fixed, the licensing agencies were generally very liberal in
granting licenses to applicants who were "fit and suitable," paid the necessary license
fee, and posted a bond which was conditioned upon compliance with the liquor
regulations of the colony.5 Some licensing agencies were so liberal that the legislature
found it necessary to direct them "to take special care for the suppressing and restraint
of the exorbitant number of ordinaries and tipling houses in their respective counties,
and not to permit in any county more than one or two"' 6 Violation of the liquor
laws by a licensee might involve a fine, forfeiture of his bond, revocation or sus-
pension of his license, refusal of a renewal license, or a combination of these penalties,
depending upon the nature of the offense and the number of times the licensee had
transgressed.i
Public houses-variously termed "ordinaries," "inns," or "taverns"--at which
travelers were lodged and liquor was sold for on-premise consumption were the chief
dispensers of intoxicating liquors and consequently were the principal objects of
colonial liquor legislation. Vendors who sold for off-premise consumption were
obliged to comply with some of the rules governing the keeper of a public house,
but the latter was subject to a much more pervasive control. In addition to securing
a license and posting a bond, the public house proprietor was compelled to comply
with a host of restrictive requirements.
His prices were fixed by the legislature or the courts." Because tavernkeepers often
evaded price-fixing regulations by adulteration and short measure, colonial legislatures
prescribed standards of measure and interdicted the "fraudulent corrupting and
mixing of wines and strong waters." The prices established by the price-fixing
agency were to be "set up in the most public room of his, her, or their houses."'"
Sales to minors, slaves, and servants were not allowed, but this prohibition could
generally be removed by the consent of the parent, owner, or master. 1 No drinks
could be served to "tavern-haunters [whose names] were to be posted at the Door of
every Tavern in the same town,"' 2 and because many Rhode Island tavern-haunters
evaded this restriction by going to neighboring towns, the legislature provided that
tavern-haunters should also be posted in as many neighboring towns as the magis-
4 2 N. H. LAws (1702-1745) 198; MAss. COL. LAws (1672-1686) 351; Howie, Three Hundred Years
of the Liquor Problem in Massachusetts (May, 1933) 18 MAss. L. Q. 79, 109.
Kotrr, op. Cst. supra note 3, at 12.
02 VA. LAws (Hening, 166o-i682) 269; see also i N. H. LAws (1679-1702) 454.
'CONN. AcTs AND LAws (1784) 243; I DEL. LAWS (1700-1792) 194; MD. LAws (1780) C. 24, §7;
MWss. COL. LAws (1672-1686) 81; 3 VA. LAWS (Hening, 1682-1710) 398.
' MAss. COL. LAWS (1672-1686) 80, 251 (legislature); 1 VA. LAws (Hening, 1619-166o) 300 (legisla-
ture); N. C. Laws 1741, C. 20, §7 (court); PA. AcTs (1775) 88, passed in 1718 (court; in Philadelphia,
the mayor, recorder, and aldermen).
'THOMIANN, COLONIAL LIQUOR LAWS (1887) 49. See also x VA. LA-ws (Hening, 1619-166o ) , 300; 2 id.
(166o-i682) 112-113; PA. ACTs (x775) 40, 47, passed in 1705.
10 1 DEL. LAWS (1700-1792) 196; Va. Acts 1769, 241.
" CoNN. AcTs AND LAws (1784) 241; M. LAws (1780) C. 24, §17; I N. H. LAws (1679-1702) 36,
117. The restriction against sales to servants and slaves was based partly upon a desire to prevent time-
wasting by those classes and partly upon fears of a slave insurrection. KIouT, op. cit. supra note 3, at 17.
" CoNs. Acrs AN LAws (1784) 242; R. I. LAWS (1798) 394, passed in 1721.
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trates thought necessary.'- Some colonies provided that liquor debts could not be
recovered in the courts while others limited the amount of credit that could be ex-
tended.14 Tavernkeepers were not to serve drinks, except to travelers, after nine
o'clock in the evening' 5 or on the Sabbath 16 and they were to prevent drunkenness,
gambling and disorderly conduct in their establishments.17 Some innkeepers were
not to sell "above halfe a pinte of wyne for one person at one time" or to permit
"tipling above the space of halfe an houre.' '
Tavernkeepers were also required to provide "convenient lodging and diet for
travellers, and pasturage, fodder, provender and stableage for horses."' The require-
ment was imposed not as a restrictive regulatory measure but for the purpose of
encouraging colonial commerce and travel. The same reason induced some legisla-
tures to encourage the establishment of inns by providing that the innkeeper should
be the sole seller of liquors in the particular district in which the inn was located.2 0
Revenue considerations also weighed heavily with the colonial legislator. A wide
range of governmental activities had to be supported and the liquor traffic was
required to contribute by paying fees, excises, and duties. The taxing power was also
used to promote the economic development of the colonies and the empire. Duties
were imposed on imported liquors "except alwaise what shall come directly from
England.' '21 Some colonies, desiring to encourage domestic liquor production,
levied discriminatory duties against liquor imported from neighboring colonies.222
Apparently no consideration was given to using the taxing power to promote tem-
13 R- I. LAws (798) 395, passed in 1725.
"'MAss. COL. LAws (x672-1686) 271 (no liquor debts recoverable); I VA. LAWS (Hening, x6z-9.6o)
287 (no liquor debts recoverable); repealed I id. 295; PA. Acrs (I775) 104, passed in x721 (limited to
20 shillings); ci. CONN. AcTs AND LAws (1784) 243 (all actions must be brought within two days of the
sale). And see Johnson and Kessler, The Liquor License System-its Origin and Constitutional Develop-
ment (1938) I5 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 210, 230 (in Maryland, licensees were required to sell on credit).
"1 CONN. CODE (I65O) 59; MAss. COL. LAws (1672-x686) 8o.
is 2 N. H. LAws (1702-1745) 196. Massachusetts required "all Taverners ... that are within one mile
of the meeting-house [to] clear their houses of all able to go to Meeting," and Pennsylvania prohibited
tipling on Sunday but permitted tavernkeepers to furnish "victuals and drink in moderation for refresh-
ment only." MAss. COL. LAws (1672-1686) 83; PA. Ac=s (1775) 25, passed in 1705.
17 1 DEL. LAws (1700-1792) 193; PA. LAws (1738) 96; I MASS. AcTs (1692-I74) 57, 154.
"8 CONN. CODE (i650) 58; MASS. COL. LAWS (1672-1786) 81. Both colonies later extended the tipling
period to one hour. CONN. Aars AND LAws (1784) 242; I MAss. AcTs (1692-1714) 154. In New Hamp-
shire, the permissible period was two hours. 2 N. H. LAws (1702-1745) x96.
103 VA. LAws (Hening, r682-I710) 396. In Maryland, this requirement was enunciated in greater
detail: "Every ordinary-keeper... shall ... be obliged to provide and maintain (if such ordinary be kept
at the court-house in any county) six good feather beds, more than sufficient for the private use of such
ordinary-keeper, with sufficient covering for the same, and Indian corn, oats, hay, straw, and stabling,
for ten horses at least; and if at any place in the county other than the court-house, three spare beds, with
covering, and sufficient stabling and provender for six horses at least . MD. LAws (780) C. 24, §5.
See also CONN. CODE (i65o) 61; Duke of Yorke's Laws 1676, 31.2
_johnson and Kessler, loc. cit. supra note 14.
213 VA. Aws (Hening, 1682-1710) 88; N. C. Laws 1752, c. 1, §5.
12 N. C. Laws 1751, c. 6: "Whereas, the inhabitants of Anson County do make quantities of strong
liquors sufficient for their own use ...be it enacted . . . that every importer of wine, rum and other
spirituous liquor from South-Carolina into Anson County shall pay as a duty... :' Cf. 2 N. H. LAws (1702-
1745) 361 (imposing duties upon all imports of wine and rum and upon all exports of boards and fish)
with 2 MAss. Acms (1715-1741) 230 (retaliating against the New Hampshire law by imposing duties upon
"every hogshead of rhum that shall be imported from the province of New Hampshire .... ).
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perance. Insofar as the imposition of fees, excises, and duties increased the cost of
alcoholic beverages and thus discouraged consumption by making liquor more diffi-
cult to obtain, the taxing policy was restrictive in effect; but there are few, if any,
indications that colonial legislatures consciously used the taxing power for purposes
of restrictive social control.
Despite the pervasive control imposed upon liquor sellers, colonial liquor regula-
tion was not designed to interfere with deeply rooted social customs. The use of
liquor was generally approved and the colonial legislator did not desire either to
discourage or prohibit the consumption of liquor.23 His main purposes were to
suppress public disorder and drunkenness, prevent profiteering and adulteration by
tavernkeepers and time-wasting by servants and slaves, encourage domestic and em-
pire liquor production, facilitate colonial commerce and travel, and secure an adequate
revenue for colonial treasuries.
The pattern of colonial liquor control was not perceptibly altered after the estab-
lishment of the federal union. The colonial opinion that moderate use of intoxicants
was helpful and stimulating continued to prevail. But gradually the temperance
societies which opposed the use of intoxicants except for medicinal purposes succeeded
in changing the popular attitude. 4 As a result, several states enacted prohibitory laws
in the eighteen thirties and forties25 and licensing restrictions became more numerous
and onerous.
Some restrictions that originated in the colonies were also imposed upon the
saloonkeeper of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Sales on Sundays, or after
closing hours, or to minors, habitual drunkards, and intoxicated persons were pro-
hibited in practically every state.26 Gambling in saloons and sales on credit were also
forbidden.27 A few states preserved the provision that sales for on-premise consump-
tion should be limited to establishments able to furnish lodging for travelers, 28 but
this requirement which was a distinctive feature of colonial control systems was not
generally retained after the first half of the nineteenth century. Legislative determina-
tion of the number of outlets and judicial or legislative price fixing were also aban-
doned by most states.29 Other restrictive measures prohibited the employment of
women or minors and provided that saloons should not be operated within certain
distances of schools, churches, and public parks and should be closed on election
.' CHERRINGTON, THE EvoLUTION OF PRoHIInoN IN THE UNITED STATES (1920) Ii. See also Howie,
supra note 4, at I1o.
54 COLVIN, PROHIBITION IN TIM UNITED STATES (1926) c. I.
1 5 See infra, p. 55 8.
"' See CYCLOPEDIA OF TE MFERANCE AND PROHIBITION (1891) 275-360; and Osborn, Liquor Statutes in
the 'United States (1888) 2 HARv. L. REV. 125, for a digest of state liquor laws.
27 Ibid.
28DEIL. CODE (1915) §x61 (not applicable to licensees in towns of over 2,ooo inhabitants); N. Y. Laws
z857, c. 629.
2' But see Ky. STAT. (1873) C. io6, art. I, §11 (county court to fix prices). Limitation of outlet legisla-
tion was, however, later enacted by several states. See, e.g., Mass. Laws 1888, c. 340 (one licensee for
every i,ooo population; in Boston, one to every 500); Ohio Laws 1913, no. 108, §24 (one saloon for
every 50o population; on petition of 35 percent of voters, election to be held to determine whether the
number of saloons should be further limited).
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days and holidays.3 0 Less frequently the statutes prohibited indecent pictures, games,
music, sales to women, the use of screens, curtains, and blinds to obstruct a clear view
of the interior of the premises, and the practice of "treating.""
A substantial number of states further burdened the dispenser of intoxicating
beverages by enacting civil damage acts.32 One form of these statutes gave a right
of action against the liquor dealer and his lessor to persons damaged because of the
intoxication of persons supplied with liquor by the dealer. Another form provided
that liquor sellers who sold intoxicants to an habitual drinker, contrary to instructions
from the drinker's relatives, should pay the latter a statutory penalty. These laws
differed in detail but their underlying purpose was the same: to impose upon the
liquor dealer responsibility for some of the consequences of his traffic. Although
many wives were reluctant to bring suit either because of the uncertainties and
expense of litigation or because husbands "persuaded" them not to do so, these
statutes did have a wholesome effect in deterring saloonkeepers from engaging in
activities that would subject them and their bondsmen to liability under the civil
damage acts.33
Several states created still another weapon to be used in suppressing the illegal
liquor traffic by providing that the unlawful sale of intoxicants constituted a nuisance
which could be enjoined; these statutes also authorized the abatement of the nuisance
by the removal and sale or destruction of the liquors and the closing of the building
for a given period 4 The advantages of this procedure were that a hostile jury could
not thwart the statutory policy by refusing to convict and that equitable proceedings,
usually being more expeditiously administered than criminal proceedings, permitted
a speedy disposition of liquor cases.
Practically every person who retailed intoxicating liquors was required to secure
a license from the proper licensing agency. 5 The underlying theory of a license
"Loc. cit. supra note 26. Some southern states, instead of prohibiting sales within 200, 300, or 400
feet of schools, as was commonly done by' northern states, enacted special laws banning sales within one,
two, three, or four miles of a particular school, thereby imposing prohibition upon the surrounding com-
munity. See, e.g., Ark. Laws 1881, nos. 9, 1O, i, 20Y 30, 34, 55, 64, 91; and see no. 74, providing that
if a majority of the adult inhabitants residing within three miles of any school should petition that
liquor sales be prohibited within three miles of the school, the county court should so order. See also
infra, p. 558.
"
1 IOWA CODE (1897) §2448 (prohibiting indecent pictures, games and music); R. I. Pub. Laws z889,
c. 8x6, §12 (prohibiting sales to women); DEL. CODE (1915) §183 (anti-screen provision); NEB. Comp.
STAT. (1889) C. 50, §31 (anti-treating provision); and see Woods, License in Place of Licensing (x916) 36
SuRvE 635.
" Lawson, The Civil Remedy for Injuries Arising from the Sale or Gift of Intoxicating Liquors, pub-
lished in BooK oF MONOGRAPHS (1877); BLACK, INTOXiCATING LIQUORS (1892) C. 13; Vicars, Construction
of the Illinois Dram Shop Act Imposing Liability upog Tavernkeeper and His Lessor for Injuries Caused
by Intoxicated Persons (1939) 14 NOTRE DAmE LAwY. 295.
" FANssAwE, LiQuoR LEISLATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA (circa 1894) 94.
"'Rounds, Injunctions Against Liquor Nuisances (x896) 9 HAIV L. REv. 521; BLAec, op. cit. supra
note 32, C. 14.
5 Two states, however, did not in theory require a license. In Ohio, the constitution of which provided
that "No license to traffic in intoxicating liquors shall . . . be granted in this State," and in Iowa, the
statutes of which prohibited the sale of intoxicants, licenses were not granted, but "mulct laws" levied a
tax upon all who sold alcoholic beverages. The payment of the tax did not constitute a license or legalize
the business. In Iowa, upon compliance with certain other conditions [see IowA CODE (1897) §2448], pay-
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system being that licenses should be granted only to competent and trustworthy
persons on such conditions as will protect the community from evils incident to the
sale and consumption of liquor, the functioning and nature of the licensing authority
is crucially significant. Despite the importance of selecting the best possible licensing
agency, the licensing statutes contained a bewildering assortment of schemes. Some
states vested the licensing power in the local governing body-county commissioners,
city or village council, township board-or provided that the local governing body
should appoint a licensing agency.36 Other statutes placed the power in a commis-
sioner or board appointed by the governor. 7 Still other states gave the licensing
power to the courts. 8 Even within a single state there might be a variety of
expedients."9
Other provisions pertaining to licensing liquor sellers exhibited the same variety
of treatment. Most statutes gave the licensing agency a broad discretion to refuse
licenses, but in some states licenses could only be refused for cause.40 Sometimes the
applicant had to secure the approval of the adjoining property owners, or of a majority
of the freeholders within the licensing area or within three miles of the premises, or
of a stated number of persons within the political unit in which the saloon was to
be located.41 Provisions for public notice of the application and opportunity for
ment of the tax merely suspended the penalties that otherwise would have been imposed for an illegal
sale; and in Ohio, failure to pay the tax merely subjected the defaulter's goods and chattels to levy and
sale by the county treasurer. See VINEs AND KOREN, Tkm LIQUOR PROBLEM IN ITS LEGisL.rsvE ASPECTS
(1897) 136-140, 292-299.
"
5 R. I. PUB. LAws (x896) c. 1o2, §§1-3; VASH. STAT. (Hill, 1891) §§28o8, 2809; WIs. REV. STAT.
(1878) §1548; WNVo. Coma,. STAT. (901) §2833.
37 2 Mo. REv. STAT. (5909) c. 63, art. II (in cities over 300,000 an excise commissioner appointed by
the governor grants licenses); MAss. PuB. STAT. (1882) c. 500, §26, Mass. Laws 1885, c. 323 (Boston
board of police which grants licenses is appointed by the governor); N. H. Laws X903, c. 95 (governor
appoints a state board which grants licenses). See also Ohio Laws 1913, no. io8 (establishing a state
board to be appointed by the governor, the state board to appoint local licensing boards).
" Ky. STAT. (1873) c. io6, art. I, §1; 2 PA. DI. STAT. (Purdon, 1700-1903) Liquors, §x7; TEx. REv.
STAT. (19xi) art. 7447; 2 VA. CODE (Pollard, 1904) 2254.
" See Koren, The Status of Liquor License Legislation (913) 2 NAT. MuN. R . 629, where it is stated
at 631: "Perhaps no commonwealth furnishes a more perfect example of confused conditions relative to
licensing authorities than New Jersey. There licenses to sell liquor may be granted: (I) By the court of
common pleas; (2) by a city council, common council, board of aldermen or other governing body; (3) by
an excise board appointed by the court of common pleas; (4) by an excise board elected by a city council
or other governing body; (5) by an excise board nominated by a mayor and confirmed by a city council;
and (6) by an excise board chosen at a general election. It is held, moreover, that when a city adopts the
commission form of government under the new law, all power to deal with liquor licenses becomes vested
in the commissioners. The statutes from which the different licensing bodies derive their existence date
as far back as 1838 and reach down to 1911. It can hardly be maintained that New Jersey attempted to
meet half a dozen essentially different conditions within her borders by as many varieties of licensing
authorities. They appear largely to be the results of accident rather than of a well-conceived plan."
" FANsHAWE, op. cit. supra note 33, at 82-83, 288.
": Ga. Laws 1884, C. 422 (applicant must file written consent of ten "of the nearest bona fide resi-
dents, five of whom shall be freeholders, owning land ...nearest to the place of business where" the
liquors were to be sold); Mo. Laws 1883, 86, §4 (majority of assessed taxpaying citizens in the square
or block in which the saloon was to be located had to sign a petition); Ind. Acts 1873, c. 59, §2
(applicant must file a petition signed by a majority of the voters in the town, township, or ward in which
the saloon was to be located); Ga. Acts 1887, no. x89, id. 1889, no. 481 (requiring applicants in named
counties to file a petition signed by two thirds of the freeholders residing within three miles of the
premises or signed by two thirds of the freeholders residing within the corporate limits of towns or
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remonstrance by interested parties were incorporated into some statutes and omitted
in others.4 2 Generally a bond-varying in amount from $25o to $6,ooo-conditioned
upon compliance with the liquor laws and payment of civil damage act liabilities
was required.4 3 Violation of the liquor statutes usually involved, in addition to a
fine and/or imprisonment, forfeiture of the license and disqualification for future
licenses; but here again there were various provisions. In some cases, the licensing
authority was given power to revoke the license of a licensee who had violated the
liquor laws; in others it was required to do so; and in still others, the court was au-
thorized to forfeit the license of a convicted licensee." A person whose license had
been revoked was thereafter disqualified from securing another license until a stated
period had elapsed.45
Some statutes fixed a single fee for a single license that was to be issued to all
sellers of intoxicants; others established several classes of licenses and fixed different
fees for them.46 Occasionally the amount of the fee depended upon the volume of
the licensee's sales or upon the amount of stock on hand or intended to be kept on
hand.4 7 Several states, following the lead of Nebraska which in i881 fixed a min-
imum annual fee of $500 for saloons in towns of less than Io,ooo population and one
of $i,ooo for those in cities of more than io,ooo, enacted so-called "high-license" laws.48
These laws were originally sponsored by prohibitionists in the hope that they would
decrease the drink traffic by eliminating a large number of sellers. It was also felt
that a licensee who paid a high price for his privilege (a) would not risk its revocation
by violating the restrictions imposed and (b) would assist in suppressing unlicensed
villages); DEL. REv. CODE (1915) §161 (twelve respectable citizens, half of whom shall be substantial
freeholders, must petition).
"'The remonstrance provisions varied considerably. In Pennsylvania [2 PA. Dio. STAT. (Purdon, i7oo-
1903) Liquors, §17], the licensing authority was to conduct a hearing (at which the remonstrants could
present their objections) and then decide whether a license should be issued, while in Rhode Island [R. I.
PuB. STAT. (1882) c. 87, §2], if the owners or occupants of the greater part of the land within 200 feet
of the premises should object, no license could be issued, and in Mississippi [Miss. REV. CODE (x88o)
§1103], the petition of a majority of the legal voters resident in the supervisor's district or incorporated
town against granting a license would prevent its issuance. A similar Kentucky statute [Ky. STAT. (Car-
roll, 1909) §4203] provided that the protests of a majority of the legal voters "in the neighborhood where
the liquor is to be sold" would invalidate an applicant's petition; the licensing agency, which was the
county court, was to determine what constituted the "neighborhood." In Massachusetts [I MAss. REv. LAws
(i9o2) c. ioo, §1:]
, 
the written objection of any owner of real estate within 25 feet of the premises
described in the application was sufficient to prevent the issuance of a license.
"'Osborn, supra note 26, at 131.
"'ILL. Rav. STAT. (Hurd, 1887) c. 43, §4 (licensing agency authorized but not required to revoke
license); i Wis. STAT. (Sanborn & Berryman, 1889) §1559 (licensing agency required to revoke license
for violation of liquor laws); 2 PA. DI. STAT. (Purdon, 1700-1903) Liquors, §17 (court required to
revoke license); see In re Carlson's License, 127 Pa. 330, 18 Ad. 8 (1889); BLACK, op. cit. supra note 32,
§§189-197; FANSHAWE, Op. Ct. supra note 33, at 87.
4rI MAss. REv. LAws (1902) C. 100, §47 (one year); R. I. Laws x889, c. 816, §11 (five years); i
Mo. REV. STAT. (i899) §30I3 (no license to be issued to person whose license has once been revoked).
"'Vt. Acts 1902, no. 90, §23 (7 classes); N. H. Laws 1903, C. 95, §6 (8 classes); I MAss. Rnv.
LAws (1902) c. XOO, §18 (7 classes). In a few states, license fees could be determined by the voters at
an election held for that purpose. See e.g., i Wis. STAT. (Sandbom & Berryman, 1889) §1548b.
7 AIz. REV. STAT. (1887) §2239 (volume of sales); CALIF. PoLiT. CODE (Deering, 1885) §3381
(volume of sales); MD. CODE (1888) Licenses, §§57-68 (amount of stock).
AS 4 STANDARD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE ALCOHOL PROBLEm (1928) 1541-1547.
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sellers. The prohibitionists soon turned against high license on the grounds that the
payment of a high license fee was an incentive to stimulate sales and that the sub-
stantial revenue received from the license fees perverted the better judgment of
prohibition-inclined voters. High license certainly did not accomplish all its sponsors
hoped, but in the opinion of most observers the objectives of reducing the number of
liquor sellers and of coercing a higher standard of action were partially achieved.4 9
The patchwork of pre-Repeal licensing legislation did not represent a satisfactory
solution of the liquor problemY0 Only rarely was there a recognition that the drink
evil was primarily caused by the use of liquors in which the percentage of alcohol
was comparatively high-the so-called hard liquors, particularly whisky. Con-
sequently there was no appreciable effort to encourage the use of beer and light
wines by legislation that discriminated in their favor and against hard liquors. At best,
however, the system of licensing private retail liquor sellers was basically unsound
for it did not remove the element of private profit. The objective of all liquor legis-
lation should be the encouragement of temperance. Stimulation of liquor sales-an
inevitable accompaniment of a licensing system based upon private profit-is incom-
patible with that goal. Further, the liquor problem became a recurring political issue
that occupied the interest of the electorate to the exclusion of equally or more sig-
nificant questions, often causing the election of incapable executive and legislative
officials solely because of their views concerning the liquor question."1 Finally, many
restrictions were often violated with impunity because the liquor interests had suffi-
cient political power to prevent prosecution. This "unholy alliance" between liquor
and politics was usually most pronounced where the liquor traffic was regulated by
the local governing agency, and public disapproval of it was a prime reason for the
adoption of the Eighteenth Amendment.5 2
CONTROL OVER PRODUCERS AND DISTRIBUTORS OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES
Liquor producers and distributors were comparatively free from the restrictive
control imposed upon retailers. Some colonies regulated certain manufacturing proc-
esses (such as the Massachusetts prohibition against use of lead pipes by distillers),
interdicted adulteration, and encouraged domestic liquor production.53 State regula-
tion did not go far beyond this. Licenses were usually required; and in securing the
license, applicants were sometimes obliged to comply with provisions similar to those
governing the issuance of retailer licenses, such as securing the approval of a stated
number of electors.54 Several statutes enabled a liquor producer to protect his brand
name by filing it with the appropriate functionary, 55 and some states in which a
"FANSHAWE, op. cit. supra note 33, at 76. Compare HAmuSON ANT) LAiNE, AFrER REPEAL (1936) i94.
o Koren, supra note 39, at 634.
1 Report of the Committee on Liquor Control Legislation of the National Municipal League (1934)
23 NAT. MUN. REV- 47, 50.
" See THE LIQuoR PROBLEm (Committee of 50, 1905) 75-78, and see infra p. 564.
13 THOMANN, COLONIAL LIQUOR LAws (1887) 34, 35, 69.
" See e.g., DEL. CODE (1915) §s85.
CI . LAWS (903) art. 27, §297; 2 WIs. STAT. (Sanborn and Berryman, 1889) §447oa.
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particular type of intoxicant was produced enacted legislation regulating its manufac-
ture."' But the most pervasive regulation to which liquor producers were subject was
that imposed by the Federal Government to ensure the collection of taxes levied
upon producers of distilled spirits and fermented liquors. 7 The requirements con-
cerning distillers (chosen at random from the United States Revised Statutes of 1875)
that are listed in the footnote sufficiently illustrate the pervasive nature of internal
revenue control. 58
State and federal governments were fairly active in preventing adulteration and
misbranding of intoxicating liquors. Early legislation prohibiting adulteration was
sometimes directed specifically against the practice of adulterating intoxicants.69
" See e.g., Calif. Laws 1887, c. 36, id. 19o7, c. 104 (regulating manufacturing of wine); Ky. STAT.
(1909) §2572a (regulating certain distillery practices). Cf. ,Vs. STAT. (1913) §1557 (establishing
standards and definitions for malt beverages).
"'Federal taxation in this field consisted of (I) a relatively small annual "special tax" imposed upon
producers and distributors and (2) an excise tax measured by the quantity of liquor produced. Internal
revenue taxes were first imposed in 179r, repealed in s8o2, re-enacted in 1813 to help defray the cost of
the War of 181a, and repealed again in z8r7. In 1862, because of Civil War expense, Congress enacted a
comprehensive internal revenue bill, a portion of which imposed excise taxes on distilled and fermented
liquors and a "special tax" upon producers and distributors.
A "special tax" was also imposed upon all retailers of intoxicating liquors. Many state statutes provided
that payment of the United States tax as a liquor seller constituted prima fade evidence that the persons
paying it were sellers of intoxicating liquors. Internal revenue records concerning the tax on retailers
generally disclosed, especially in prohibition states, that large numbers of individuals, who according to
state law could not legally sell liquor, paid the federal retailer tax. The only fair conclusion is that there
was widespread violation of state liquor laws. See infra note 9z, and see RowNTRaa AND SHERwEaL, THE
TEMPERANCE PRO3LEM AND SOCIAL REFORM (7th ed. 19oo) 131-134.
" Before a person could become a distiller, he had to file a notice of intention to carry on the business
of distiller, specifying the kind of stills, the cubic contents thereof, and other pertinent information, and
also file a bond conditioned that he would comply with the law, pay all penalties and fines, and not
permit the land on which the distillery was situated to become encumbered during the time in which he
carried on the distilling business (§§3z59, 3260). He was required either to own in fee, unencumbered
by any lien, the land on which the distillery was to be situated or to secure the written consent of the
owners and any lienholders that the lien of the United States for taxes and penalties should have
priority; if, for enumerated reasons, such consent could not be obtained, the applicant was to file a bond
signed by not less than two sureties conditioned that if the distillery were forfeited for violation of the
law, the obligors would pay the amount stated in the bond, which was to be equal to the appraised value
of the land (§3262.). Prior to the approval of his bond, the would-be distiller had to submit an accurate
plan of the distillery and no alteration could be made in the distillery without the consent in writing of
the collector of internal revenue (§3263). The building and plant had to conform to certain specifications
established by Congress and some parts of the distillery were to be under the lock and seal of an officer
of the internal revenue department (3267). At any time of the night or day, any revenue officer could
lawfully enter any distillery and it was the duty of the distiller to furnish him with all means necessary
to inspect the premises (§3277). Every distiller was required to post a sign, "Registered Distillery," outside
his place of business (§3279). It was illegal to operate any still between eleven p.m. Saturday and one a.m.
Monday or to make any mash or remove any liquor in the absence of the government storekeeper (§§3283,
3284). Fermenting tubs could not be filled more often than was prescribed by law and liquor was drawn
off, gauged, and marked subject to the regulations of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (§§3285,
3287). These and other regulations (§3449) providing for the marking of liquor came to be regarded by
the trade as a guarantee of the genuineness of the product. 3 STANDARD ENCY. or THE TEMPERANCE
PROBLEM (1926) 1329. This list of internal revenue requirements is by no means complete; it is sufficient
however to illustrate its detailed character.
" E.g., Pennsylvania in 1705 prohibited the adulteration of "rume, brandy, or such like spirits." PA.
LAws (Dunlop, 1700-1852) 56. See also THOMANN, COLONIA. LIQuoR LAws (1887) passim.
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Later enactments, including the Federal Food and Drugs Act of 19o6,60 were more
comprehensive, being designed to prevent adulteration and misbranding of foods
and drugs.6 1 Inasmuch as the term "food" was almost invariably defined to include
liquor, these laws regulated liquor manufacturing and labeling practices.62  The
procedure followed in administering these acts generally involved the adoption of
definitions or standards to which the product and its label were to comply. In a few
states, certain types of liquor were defined by statute, while in others, power to adopt
definitions and standards was delegated to the enforcing officialsP3 In still others,
the standards and definitions established by the Secretary of Agriculture were to
be incorporated into the state law.64 In fact, the Food and Drugs Act did not give
the Secretary power to establish food standards; but he did promulgate advisory
standards which satisfied the requirements of these state statutesP 5
The most prominent Food and Drugs Act ruling concerning intoxicants involved
the proper use of the term "whisky." The story of its promulgation merits telling,
for it depicts the administration of the Food and Drugs Act in the alcoholic beverage
field and presents a revealing sidelight on the character of President Taft who gave
vent to his judicial temperament by participating in the administration of the Food
and Drugs Act. Shortly after the adoption of the Act, the Department of Agriculture,
which administered it, ruled that a mixture composed of 51 percent straight whiskies
and 49 percent neutral spirits could not be labeled blended whiskies because such a
label would be misleading.66 A few months later, Attorney General Bonaparte,
acting at the request of President Roosevelt, issued an opinion which approved the
Department's ruling.6 7 The opinion reasoned that neutral spirits were not whiskies
and inasmuch as Section Eight of the Act defined a blend as a "mixture of like sub-
stances," a mixture of straight whisky and neutral spirits could not properly be
labeled a blend. Such a mixture should be branded "Whisky. A compound of grain
distillates."' 8 The opinion also ruled that neutral spirits mixed with harmless coloring
o 34 STAT. 708 (1906).
6L Conover, National, State and Local Cooperation in Food and Drug Control (1928) 22 Am. POL. SC.
REv. 95o; Salthe, State Food, Drug and Cosmetic Legislation and Its Administration (1939) 6 LAW AND
CoNrrsrMP. PROB. 165.
02 The federal definition is illustrative: "The term 'food,' as used herein shall include all articles used
for food, drink, confectionery, or condiment by man or other animals, whether simple, mixed, or com-
pound." Foos Arm DRucs Aar, §6.
"
3 WEsERvELT, AmERIcAN POmE FooD AND DRUG LAws (1912) contains a comprehensive digested
compilation of the various food and drugs acts, and related legislation. See especially §§26, 28, 6x.
64 Ibid. "0 Salthe, supra note 61, at 167.
" Food Inspection Decision 45 (19o6) (hereinafter cited F. I. D.). Food Inspection Decisions are in
the nature of expressions of opinion by the Department of Agriculture. The Department thus explained
their status: "The opinions or decisions of this Department do not add anything to the rules and regula-
tions nor take anything away from them. They therefore are not to be considered in the light of rules
and regulations. On the other hand, the decisions and opinions referred to express the attitude of this
Department in relation to the interpretation of the law and the rules and regulations.... They are . . .
issued more in an advisory than in a mandatory spirit." F. I. D. 44 (19o6), quoted in Hayes and Ruff,
The Administration of the Federal Food and Drugs Act (1933) 1 LAw AND CoNrEmp. PRoB. 16, 20.67 26 Oss. A=rn. GENr. 216 (April XO, 1907).
"I1d. at 228-231. This ruling was qualified by the requirement that the neutral spirits be distilled
from grains and that there be "enough whisky in [the mixture] to make it a real compound and not
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and flavoring substances so as to have the appearance and flavor of whisky should
be labeled "Imitation whisky." These rulings were approved by President Roosevelt
who directed the Secretary of Agriculture to administer the Act in accordance there-
with.69 Distillers who were thus obliged to use the labels "Imitation whisky" and
"Whisky. A compound of grain distillates," contrary to trade practices that had to
some extent prevailed for many years,70 induced the Attorney General to grant a
hearing concerning the correctness of his opinion, but the earlier decision was not
changed."' Approximately nine months later, on February I9, I909, the Attorney
General rendered a third opinion in which he re-affirmed the conclusions of his
earlier decisions.72 A few weeks later Mr. Taft became President, and the distillers
immediately appealed to him. The President referred the question to Solicitor Gen-
eral Bowers who conducted a hearing and submitted an opinion.73 President Taft
then took sufficient time from his executive duties to hear arguments on the correct-
ness of the Solicitor General's findings, to read "with care the entire evidence
adduced," 4 and to write and issue what is known as the Taft Report." The Presi-
dent maintained that the question was "one of correct branding to prevent deception
of the public as to what it was buying" and he concluded that it was the understand-
ing of the trade and of consumers that the term whisky "included all potable liquor
distilled from grain. '76 Therefore neutral spirits which were distilled from grain
and which were colored and flavored with harmless substances in the customary
manner were entitled to be labeled whisky; and a mixture of neutral spirits distilled
from grain and straight whisky could rightfully be labeled a "Blend of whiskies"
because both substances were whiskies and a blend is a mixture of like substances.
The Report also ruled that whisky should be so branded as to show exactly the kind
of whisky it was. These Presidential rulings were accepted by both the Department
of Agriculture and the trade, and apparently settled the question of how whisky
the mere semblance of one." On December 7, 19o8, the Attorney General ruled that "enough whisky"
would be not less than one third by volume of straight whisky. F. I. D. 98 (19o8).
F. I. D. 65 (1907).
o Woolner & Co. v. Rennick et al., 17o Fed. 662, 665 (C. C. S. D. I1. 19o8).
26 Ops. ATmy. GEN. 262 (May 29, 1907).
27 Id. 202 (Feb. I9, 19o9). In this opinion the Attorney General cited two cases involving an internal
revenue provision, Section 3449 of the Revised Statutes (making it illegal to ship, transport or remove any
liquors "under any other than the proper name or brand known to the trade as designating the kind and
quality of the contents of the casks or packages containing the same") that sustained his position.
71 Report of the Solicitor General to the President upon Certain Questions Submitted to Him Concern-
ing the Meaning of the Term "Whisky" (I909), printed in FEDERAL FOOD AND DRIIos ACT AND DEcisioNs
(1914) 8M8.
"' The hearing before Mr. Bowers was very extended; the testimony comprised 2,365 pages, in addition
to a voluminous mass of documentary evidence.
" Taft, What Is the Meaning of the Term "Whisky" Under the Pure Food 4ct and the Proper Regtla.
lions for Branding Various Kinds of Whisky Under the Internal Revenue Act? (19o9), printed in
THORNTON, LAw OF FooD AN DRuos (1912) 450-461.
"' The President also stated that ". . . straight whisky is, as compared with the whisky made by
rectification or redistillation and flavoring and coloring matter, a subsequent improvement, and ...there-
fore it is a perversion of the pure food act to attempt now to limit the meaning of the term 'whisky' to
that which modem manufacture and taste have made the most desirable variety." THORNTON, op. ct. supra
note 75, at 457.
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should be labeled until some 25 years later when the adoption of the Twenty-first
Amendment raised the problem anew.77
Consumer protection against adulterated and misbranded liquors given by the
food and drugs acts was not paralleled by effective governmental action against price
control by producers. Despite the Sherman Anti-Trust Act of I8907 and similar
state constitutional and statutory provisions, some of which were in force before the
federal enactment,79 combinations of liquor producers kept liquor prices at relatively
high levels.80 From 189o to the time of Repeal, the price of spirits was substantially
higher than the general price level-in some years, more than 30 percent over the
general index.81 Failure of the appropriate enforcing officials to curb these combina-
tions may perhaps be attributed to the political power of the liquor interests, for there
is ample evidence of their political force.82 Whatever the reason, there was a
deplorable failure to prevent price fixing.
Another instance of governmental inability to control effectively the activities of
producers and distributors is found in the so-called "tied-house" relationship between
producers and distributors on one side, and retailers on the other. Under the tied-
house arrangement, brewers, distillers, and wholesalers financed the establishment
and/or maintenance of saloons and thereafter controlled the saloonkeeper they had
assisted. Legislation against the tied-house system was occasionally enacted, 83 but it
was not very effective.8 4 Several undesirable consequences resulted from this tie-up
between saloons and the liquor interests. Saloonkeepers were under a continual
" Some other distilled spirits labeling problems under the Food and Drugs Act were treated in the
following: Regulatory Announcement of Jan. 25, 1916, printed in I DUNN, FooD AND DRUG LAws (1927)
35 (the statement of quantity on the bottled-in-bond internal revenue stamp does not satisfy the require-
ments imposed by the amendment of March 3, 1913, 37 STAT. 732, that the quantity of the contents of
any package shall be plainly and conspicuously marked on the outside thereof); Regulatory Announcement
of Jan. 26, x9x6, printed in a Duroc, op. cit., at 54 (substances labeled or sold as "Scotch whisky" which
are not manufactured in Scotland are deemed misbranded); F. I. D. 126 (i9io) ("Canadian Club Whisky"
is such a "distinctive" name under the provisions of Section 8, paragraphs io and Ix, that it need not be
labeled "A blend of whiskies"); United States v. 36 Bottles of London: Dry Gin, 205 Fed. III (E. D. Pa.,
1913) (jury question whether the use of the label "London Dry Gin" resulted in false branding as to the
country in which the liquor was produced) revsd oa other grounds, 21o Fed. 271 (C. C. A. 3d, 1914).
18 26 STAT. 209 (1890). " Legis. (1932) 32 COL. L. REV. 347.
"o JENKs AND CLARK, TsE TRusT PRoBLam (Sih ed. 1929) 99-107. See also r Ind. Comm. Rep. 74
(igoo); House Rep., No. 26o (Mar. 1893); Jenks, The Development of the Whiskey Trust (1889) 4
POL. Sc. Q., 296.
5 1 JENKS AND CsARK, op. cit. supra note 8o, at 107.
8 1 Nat. Comm. on Law Obs. and Enf., Report on the Enforcement of the Prohibition Laws of the United
States, H. R. Doc. No. 722, 71st Cong., 3 d Sess. (1931) 6; COLVIN, PROMBIOON INe THE UNITED STATEs
(X926) 55z et seq.
"'See e.g., Iowa Laws 1894, c. 62, §17; Ohio Laws 1913, no. io8, §i9. The Iowa provision
prohibited any person from being surety on more than one liquor bond. Ohio was more thorough, pro-
viding: "License shall not be granted to any applicant who is is any way interested in the business con-
ducted at any other place where intoxicating liquors are sold or kept for sale as a beverage, nor shall such
license be granted unless the applicant or applicants are the only persons in any way pecuniarily interested
in the business for which the license is sought, and no other person shall be in any way interested therein
during the continuance of the license...."
"' Nat. Comm. on Law Obs. and Enf., loc. cit. supra note 82; Grant, The Liquor Traffic Before the
Eighteenth Amendment (Sept., 1932) 163 ANNALS I, 4 (it was being charged at the time of the Eighteenth
Amendment that 8o percent of the retail outlets were tied-houses).
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
pressure to stimulate sales, thus increasing consumption which often led to intemper-
ance. The distiller or brewer, being an absentee owner, cared little for the social
disruption that resulted from a policy of forcing saloonkeepers to stimulate sales;
his interest was in increased sales, not in social welfare."5 The tied-house system also
resulted in the establishment of a great number of retail outlets because every pro-
ducer felt that he had to have an outlet in each market. An excess of outlets meant
a stimulation of sales, with resulting intemperance. The evils of the tied-house
system and the corrupting political influence of the liquor interests were major causes
for the adoption of national prohibition.86
GOVERNMENT MONOPOLY COmTROL
Government monopoly of the sale of liquor for general consumption originated
in the United States in thde college town of Athens, Georgia, in 1891.87 During the
next 25 years many other towns and counties in Alabama, Georgia, North Carolina,
South Carolina and Virginia established similar municipal monopolies.88 And in
1893, South Carolina instituted a statewide monopoly.89 Under this plan, the state
was to be the sole seller of liquors. A central wholesale dispensary was to be estab-
lished; saloons were to be abolished and their place taken by retail dispensaries where
" See FOSDICK AND SCOTT, TowARD LiQUOR CONTROL (1933) 43. As Captain W. S. Alexander, Ad-
ministrator of the Federal Alcoholic Administration, succinctly observes, . . . the fact remains that under
the tied house system the retailer is not responsible to society. When someone else sets a licensee up in
business, buys his license, furnishes him with a house to do business in and puts in the fixtures and his
stock who is Lord and Master there-society or the man who pays for all this?" Address before the Nat.
Alcoholic Beverage Control Ass'n, Aug. 24, 1938. FA-x52.
"' Nat. Comm. on Law Obs. and Enf., loc cit. supra note 82.
872 Ga. Acts i89o-89i, no. 345. A possible qualification of the statement in the text is that some
prohibition states had earlier established quasi-governmental "town agencies" which were given the sole
right to sell liquors for "medicinal, chemical, and mechanical purposes" [Mass. Acts 1852, c. 322, §2].
SITES, CENTRALIZED ADMINISTRATION op LiQUOR LAws IN THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTHS (1899) 102-
io6. But the town agency system was used only in prohibition states and was not in any sense a substitu-
tion for the licensing system, as was the dispensary plan.
The European precursor of the American dispensary system was the so-called Gothenburg system that
originated in Gothenburg, Sweden, in 1865. The basis of this system was the elimination of private profit
from the sale of liquor by giving to a company of private citizens a monopoly of the liquor trade. The
company was to establish retail outlets that were to be strictly supervised and all company profits in
excess of six percent on its investment were to be paid over to the town treasury. On the Gothenburg
system, see GouLD, POPULAR CONTROL OF -an LIQUOR ThAri'c (1895).
" BLAxEY, Tan SALE OF LIQUOR IN ra SotrM (1912) C. 3. On Nov. 8, 1898, the electorate of the
state of South Dakota by a vote of 22,170 votes for and 20,557 against approved the following constitu-
tional amendment:
"Section I. The manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors shall be under exclusive state control
and shall be conducted by duly authorized agents of the state who shall be paid by salary and not by
commissions ...
"Section 2. The legislature shall by law prescribe regulations for the enforcement of the provisions
of this article and provide suitable and adequate penalties for the violation thereof."
The legislature, however, did not enact enabling legislation, allegedly because of pressure exerted by the
Sioux Falls Brewery [RowNTREE AND SHERWELL, op. cit. supra note 57, at 431] and the Supreme Court of
South Dakota held in the case of State v. Bradford, 12 S. D. 207, 8o N. W. 143 (1899), that until the
legislature prescribed regulations for enforcement of the constitutional provision, the old licensing law
remained in effect. At the general election of 59oo, the electorate voted 48,673 to 33,927 to repeal the
above amendment thus ending the incipient dispensary movement.
" S. C. Acts 1892, no. 28, effective July, 1893.
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liquor would be sold by the bottle for off-premise consumption; purchasers were to
be registered; sales were not to be made in the evenings or to minors, habitual
drunkards or intoxicated persons. The administration of the system was to be vested
in a Board of Control consisting of the governor, the attorney general, and the comp-
troller general; later it became a five-man board elected by the legislature.90 The
Board was to appoint dispensary officials and county boards of control which in turn
were to appoint local dispensers. The profits of the wholesale dispensary were to be
allotted to the school fund and local dispensary profits were to be divided equally
between the county and the municipality.
Theoretically such a system was ideal; and there is evidence of its accomplish-
ments. In 1892, before the dispensary law was enacted, there were 613 licensed
saloons, while at no time during the history of the dispensary system were there more
than 146 dispensaries. 91 Arrests for drunkenness fell off from one third to one half
under the dispensary law.92 Mr. John Koren who investigated the system for the
Committee of Fifty93 concluded that "It is ... beyond all cavil true that in the cities
and towns formerly under license the dispensary law has promoted sobriety and in
a truly wonderful degree." '94 Yet in 19o7, the commonwealth dispensary system was
replaced by a county dispensary system 5 and in 1915, statewide prohibition was
adopted. 0 Why the change? Does the experience of South Carolina presage a
similar failure for subsequent attempts to remove the private profit element from
retail liquor selling?
The South Carolina dispensary system failed (i) because it was administered by
corrupt politicians who used the system (a) to strengthen their political machines
and (b) to enrich their own private fortunes and (2) because it did not eliminate
the private profit motive from retail sales. The dispensary law was originally spon-
sored by Governor Tillman as a compromise measure that would stave off prohibition
and at the same time not alienate the prohibitionist vote which was essential to the
maintenance of his political power.9 Political considerations, so easily discernible
in the inception of the dispensary system, also determined the nature of its adminis-
tration. Politics decided who should be appointed officials and the appointees in
turn kept faith by working diligently for the welfare of the party.98 Besides, those
oo S. C. Acts 1896, no. 61, §2.
o' Christensen, The State Dispensaries of South Carolina (Nov. 19o8) 32 ANNALS 545. These figures
do not include the number of illicit sellers that existed under both systems. In i9oo, there were 388
persons other than legal dispensers who paid the United States "special tax" imposed on liquor sellers.
ii EN CYc. BRIT. (ixth ed. 191) 768.
oVWINES AND KoREN, op. ct. supra note 35, at 176-178.
o The Committee of Fifty which was composed of such eminent men as Charles W. Eliot, President
of Harvard, Seth Low, and others sponsored a ten-year survey of the liquor question.
" WINEs AND KOREN, op. cit. supra note 35, at 179.
01 S. C. Acts 1907, no. 226.
"0S. C. Acrs 1915, no. 76. Prohibition was voted upon on Sept. x4, 1915, and was approved by a
majority of over 24,000 or 71 percent of those voting. CHEIRINGTON, THE EvoLUTION OF PROIBITION IN
TH UNITD STATES (1920) 342; COLVIN, PROmBITrON IN THE UNITED STxaES (1926) 302.
"
7 WINES AND KOREN, Op. ct. supra note 35, at 141-147.
s CoLviN, op. cit. supra note 96, at 298-299.
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in charge of the dispensary system sold offices, accepted bribes from distillers and
others who were interested in selling liquor to the state, and embezzled substantial
sums from the systemY9 Finally, the elimination of the personal profit motive which
should be a cornerstone of government monopoly control was not achieved by the
South Carolina dispensary system. Quite the contrary, the retail dispenser had every
reason to stimulate sales, for his salary depended upon the amount of liquor sold.100
South Carolina's experience is thus an object lesson of the prostitution of government
monopoly control. It in no way presages failure for more soundly conceived and
better administered monopoly plans.
PROHIBTON CONTROL
National prohibition in the United States did not represent an abrupt break with
previous control legislation. On the contrary, it climaxed a long history of temperance
reform. During the first three or four decades of the nineteenth century, the primary
objective of the temperance movement was to secure individual pledges of personal
abstinence.101 Prohibitory legislation was resorted to only after moral suasion had
failed. Prohibitory measures for which the temperance movement was chiefly re-
sponsible include high license laws,102 local option statutes, state prohibition pro-
visions, federal legislation in aid of state prohibitory policies, and the Eighteenth
Amendment. 03
Local Option.
Under local option legislation, local political units are permitted to decide whether
licenses to sell liquor should be granted. Maine in 1829, Indiana in 1832, and Georgia
in 1833, were apparently the first American commonwealths to experiment with the
local option principle 04 During the next 20 years, a number of states enacted
similar legislation and by 19o6, there were 30 states with local option laws1 °5 A few
of the early statutes were held to be invalid on the theory that the legislature had
delegated law-making power to the people, but the courts later almost unanimously
sustained the laws. 06
The local option measure that prevailed in most states permitted the electorate of
a local political unit to vote that no licenses should be granted; thereafter no licenses
"' Christensen, supra note 9z; B1.Axny, op. cit. supra note 88, at i9, quoting from the report of the
committee appointed to liquidate the state dispensary system: "Some of the 'officials who fattened at the
expense of the State became shameless in their abuse of power, insatiable in their greed, and perfidious in
their disregard of their oaths of office.. . We desire to express satisfaction at having reached the end ot
a business. . . disgusting in revelations of corruption which had so deplorably permeated the busi-
ness... :
100 WINEs AND KoREN, op. ct. supra note 35, at 168; COLVIN, op. ct. supra note 96, at 296.
... Warburton, Prohibition (1934) 12 EscYC. So. SCIENCES 499, 500.
""
5 See supra pp. 55o-55i.
... Although these measures were originally sponsored by temperance leaders, they later rejected high
license and local option as desirable methods for reaching their objective.
...Me. Pub. Acts 1829, c. 133; Ind. Laws 1832, c. 17O; Ga. Acts 1833, 125.
.. Vance, The Fight for More Anti-Liquor Legislation (1916) 23 CASE & Com. 38, 43; Warburton,
supra note zos, at 502.
.0. BrAcx, INToxcATING LIQuoRs (1892) 545; Note (1938) 23 IowA L. REv. 635.
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were to be issued until a subsequent election reversed the no-license decision. In
Arkansas, however, the statute provided that unless a majority of the votes cast in
the county were "For license" no licenses should be granted.' 0 7 Thus the Arkansas
system was prohibition with local option for license, rather than license with local
option for prohibition, as in most states.' s Other provisions embodying a local option
principle required each applicant for a liquor license to secure the approval of a
majority or two thirds of the voters of the political unit within which the saloon was
to be located, or provided that the remonstrance of a majority of the voters would
prevent the issuance of a license or that no licenses should be issued in the locality if
a majority of the voters so petitioned.109 Local option was accomplished indirectly
in some states by the licensing agency's refusal to issue licenses.110 In others, localities
secured local prohibition pursuant to special legislation that permitted thde electorate
to vote for local prohibition but made no provision for resubmitting the question."'
The latter cannot strictly be called local option, for the option feature was eliminated
after prohibition was voted in.
Legislation governing other local option features was similarly diversified. In
some states, the local option unit was the county;" 2 in others, the vote was taken
by cities, villages, or towns; 113 and in still others, districts within a city could exclude
saloons.1" 4 Some statutes provided thai local option elections should be held every
one or two years, but in most states, local option elections were held only after a
petition of a certain percentage of the voters." 5 No such election was to be held
within one, two, three, or four years of a previous local option election, and often it
could not be held at the time of any general election." Although the question voted
on usually involved only the issue of whether the sale of all intoxicating liquors
should be approved or disapproved, a few statutes did permit local option voters to
prohibit the sale of distilled liquors and/or lighter intoxicants, or to prohibit sales
for on-premise consumption and/or for off-premise consumption.117
The chief value of a local option system is that it permits local sentiment to de-
"
T ARx. DIG. STAT. (1884) §4515.
... Osborn, supra note 26, at 125, i29. The Iowa system was somewhat similar. The state had a
prohibition statute; but the mulct law (see supra note 35) provided that if the seller paid a "tax" and,
in cities of 5,000 or more, if "a written statement of consent signed by a majority of voters residing in
said city who had voted at the last general election" should be filed with the county auditor, prosecutions
for violating the prohibitory law should be barred. IA. CODa (1897) §2448.
... Supra notes 41, 42; Ill. Laws 1838-1839, 71-72; Ga. Laws i86o, no. 152.
0 RowraaE ANn SHERW ELL, op. cit. supra note 57, at 285-296.
"I Ga. Acts 1875, no. 263; Md. Laws 1876, c. 79; Miss. Laws 1856, c. So. Local prohibition was also
often secured by special acts of the legislature that prohibited the sale of intoxicants in a particular locality.
See Ga. Acts 1875, nos. 117, 281, 332; Md. Laws 1876, C. 313; Miss. Laws 1856, c. 150.1 1
'IcH. Comps'. LAws (1897) §5414; MoNT. REV. CODE (1907) §2041.
... ,VIs. STAT. (1898) §§1565a-I565c; S. D. Rav. CODE (1903) §2856.
... Omo CODE (19IO) §§6140-6168; ILL. REV. STAT. (Hurd, 1913) c. 43, §§25-43.
... These provisions and the states which enacted them are collected and discussed in Osborn, supra
note 26, at 128-130; RownuEa AND SHEawELL, op. cit. supra note 57, c. 4; COLVIN, op. cit. supra note
96, C. 20; 4 STANDARD ENCYC. OF THE ALCOHOL PROBLEM (1928) 1586.
ib1 id.
"X N. Y. CONSOL. LAws (1909) c. 34, §13; Vt. Laws 1902, no. 9o; CYCLOPEDIA OF TEamPEPANCa AND
PtomaMON (1891) 390.
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termine the liquor policy of the community; the same public opinion that resolves
the question of sale or no sale is responsible for enforcement. But pre-Repeal local
option was deficient in three particulars. Because only a comparatively short time
was required to elapse between one election and another-generally two years or
less-the liquor problem became a recurring political issue that perverted the atten-
tion of the electorate from more significant questions.118 Failure to permit local
option voters to discriminate between the various types of intoxicants or between
sales for on-premise and those for off-premise consumption unduly canalized public
opinion. The general practice of making large and populous political divisions the
local option unit was unsatisfactory because those divisions very often contained
smaller homogeneous areas which should have been permitted to determine their
own liquor policies. A local option measure that has been strengthened by careful
draftsmanship to remove these weaknesses'1 can be a valuable adjunct to a control
system, for local option rests upon the sound premise that laws, especially sumptuary
laws, must express the will of the governed-a premise too often forgotten or dis-
regarded by temperance leaders.
State Prohibition.'2 0
Statewide prohibition was first adopted by an American state or territory in 1844
when the territorial legislature of Oregon enacted a general prohibition law.121 After
the Oregon enactment, Maine in 1846 and Delaware in 1847 also adopted prohibition
laws; 1 22 and New Hampshire in 1849 and Michigan in 185o prohibited the issuance
of liquor licenses.' 23  During the next five years, these four states strengthened their
laws' 24 and another ten states enrolled under the prohibition banner.1 25 But this first
"1" This evil was of course aggravated in those states where local option elections were held at the
time of the general election.
119 See proposals of Fosiicx AND SCOTT, TowARD LIQuoR CONTROL (1933) 54, and for post-Repeal
practices, see HARRIsoN AND LAINE, AFra REPEAL (X936) 72-73.
'20 It should be noted at the outset that the term "prohibition" is really a misnomer, for most laws
did not completely prohibit the manufacture or sale of intoxicating beverages. In most prohibition states,
drug stores or town agencies were permitted to sell intoxicating liquor for medicinal purposes; generally
personal manufacture of wine and beer for personal use was not forbidden, and many dry states permitted
importation for personal use. See Fosoicx AND ScoTT, op. cit. supra note 119, at 22-23.
'' Ore. Laws 1843-1849, 94, repealed in 1849. CHERRINGTON, Op. cit. supra note 96, at 126, 133.
Earlier United States prohibition measures include: (I) a regulation of the Board of Trustees of the
colony of Georgia, enacted in 1733 and repealed in 1742, that prohibited importation and consumption
of rum in the colony [3 STANDARD ENcyc. OF TE ALCOHOL PROBLEM (1926) 1077; THOMfANN, COLONIAL
LIQUOR LAws (1887) 194-196]; (2) prohibitions against the sale of intoxicating liquors to Indians which
were enacted in practically every colony [THomANN, passim]; (3) statutes enacted in several New England
states that prohibited the sale of liquor in quantities less than 28 or 15 gallons [Vance, Growth of Anti-
Liquor Legislation (1916) 23 CASE & CoN. 824, 827]; (4) federal statutes prohibiting sales of intoxicating
liquor to Indians [4 S'TsT. 732 (1834); 13 STAT. 29 (1864); United States v. Holliday, 70 U. S. 407
(x865); United States v. 43 Gallons of Whisky, 93 U. S. 188 (1876)].
z Me. Acts 1846, c. 205; Del. Laws 1847, C. 184.
123N. H. Laws 1849, c. 846; Mich. Const., art. IV, §47.
... Me. Acts 1851, c. 211, 1853, c. 48; Del. Laws 1855, c. 255; N. I. Laws z855, c. 1658; Mich. Laws
1855, no. 17.
... Conn. Pub. Acts 1853, c. 57; Il. Pub. Laws 185i, x8-i9; Ind. Laws 1855, c. io5; Iowa Laws 1855,
C. 58; Mass. Laws 1852, C. 322; Neb. Laws 1855, 158; N. Y. Laws 1855, C. 231; R. I. Acts 1852, 3; Vt.
Laws 1852, no. 24; Pa. Laws 1855, no. 239, repealed before it went into operation. COLviN, op. cit. supra
note 96, at 34.
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wave of state prohibition was short-lived. Some of the laws were held to be uncon-
stiutional;' 26 others were amended to permit the sale of some intoxicants;1 27 and
still others were completely repealed.' 28 Divided public sentiment caused the reaction
from this first prohibition crusade. The temperance societies were strong enough to
secure a trial for prohibition, but they were not sufficiendy powerful to force its
retention. 29
At the beginning of the decade between i88oi and 189o, during which the second
great prohibition movement occurred, only three states-Maine, Vermont, and New
Hampshire-had a dry status. During that decade five more states adopted prohibi-
tion, but one of these, Rhode Island, abandoned it before i89o.13° During that time,
too, the legislatures of nine states either refused to submit the question of prohibition
to the electorate, or rejected prohibition proposals, and in ii other states where the
question was submitted to the voters, prohibition was not adopted.' 31 During the
ten-year period, then, four states had been added to the prohibition list, making a
total of seven prohibition commonwealths in 189o (four of whom deserted the dry
ranks by 1903)132 and 21 states had refused to accept prohibition. The next prohibi-
tion wave was, however, much more successful. Engineered by the Anti-Saloon
League, it began in 1907 and ended in i99, during which time 30 states adopted
prohibition laws' 33
Judged by any objective standard, statewide prohibition was not a satisfactory
answer to the liquor question. Liquor consumption did not decrease during the
period when the statewide prohibition movement was strongest.134 The records of
competent students who carefully observed state prohibition in operation clearly
demonstrate that the laws were widely violated, surreptitiously in some localities,
openly and notoriously in others- 35 Public officials were corrupted and otherwise
law-abiding citizens who opposed what they conceived to be unwarranted interference
with their freedom, participated in .illegal sales'3 6 Official corruption and habitual
law violation begot a widespread disrespect for law and order--"too great a price to
12. O'Daily v. State, 9 Ind. 494 (1857); Beebe v. State, 6 Ind. 5oi (1855) Wynehamer v. People, 13
N. Y. 378 (856).
2 See Clark, The History ol Liquor Legislation in Iowa (igo8) 6 IowA J. oF Hist. AND POL. 55, 83-87.
1' Conn. Pub. Acts 1872, c. 99, §13; Del. Laws 1857, c. 330; Ill. Pub. Laws 1853, 127; Mich. Laws
1875, no. 228; Mass. Laws i868, c. i41; Neb. Laws 1859, 256; Pa. Laws 1856, no. 233, §35; R. I. Acts
1863, c. 444, §I1. 121 Warburton, supra note Ioi, at 501.
120 Kansas (188o), Rhode Island (i886), repealed in 2889, Iowa (2884), South Dakota (1889), and
North Dakota (1889). See CHESmUNGTo, op. ci. supra note 96, at 176-284.
121 Ibid.
1 Iowa Laws 1894, c. 62 (the mulct law that retained prohibition in name but in fact permitted
retail sale of intoxicants. See supra notes 35, io8; and see Clark, supra note 127, at 596 et seq.); S. D.
Laws 1897, c. 72 (enacted after constitutional prohibition had been repealed in 2896); Vt. Laws 2902,
No. go; N. H. Laws 1903, c. 95.
12' For an interesting account of the Anti-Saloon League, see ODEGARD, PaessUmE POLsICS (1928).
The thirty states and the dates they adopted prohibition are listed in Warburton, supra note ioi, at 502,
and in COLvEi, op. cit. supra note 96, at 435. 14 Warburton, supra note 1oi, at 503.
..
5 WINas AND KOREN, op. cit. supra note 35; FANs-AVw, op. cit. supra note 33; RoWNTREE AND SH-ER-
WLL, op. cit. supra note 57. 136 Ibid.
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pay for whatever gains may [have been] secured."' 3 7 These evils were the inevitable
result of divided public sentiment; prohibition, which interferes so drastically with
deeply rooted habits and customs, cannot be successful unless there is an overwhelm-
ing public support behind it. This bitter lesson was well learned during national
prohibition; it is unfortunate that the United States did not heed the failure of state
prohibition and thus avoid the painful experience of the "noble experiment."
Federal Legislation in Aid of State Prohibitory Laws.
The need for legislation of this type was convincingly demonstrated by two Su-
preme Court cases involving prohibition laws. In the first, an Iowa statute which
prohibited the transportation of intoxicating liquor into Iowa by a carrier unless the
shipper furnished a certificate that the consignee was authorized to sell liquor was
held invalid because it conflicted with Congressional "intention" that the transporta-
tion of commodities between states shall be free.18  The second decision applied the
original package doctrine to deny the right of the state to prohibit the sale of in-
toxicating liquors in their original packages.'8 9 State prohibition laws were thus
largely nullified, for liquor dealers could and did sell intoxicants in their original
packages and the states were powerless to interfere.'
40
Legislation to remedy this situation was sought from Congress which promptly
passed the Wilson Act.' 4 ' This law provided that liquors upon "arrival" in a state
should be "subject to the operation and effect of the laws of such State... in the
same manner as though such.., liquors had been produced in such State.... ." The
statute was held to be constitutional, 42 but the word "arrival" was construed to mean
delivery to the consignee and not a mere arrival within the boundaries of the state.
1 48
Thus until the goods were delivered to the consignee they were in interstate commerce
and the states had no power to interfere with the free flow of that commerce.
144
Accordingly, while a drinker could not legally purchase from a state liquor vendor,
it was perfectly permissible for him to order from out-of-state dealers. The Wilson
Act made it more inconvenient to secure liquor, but that was all.
Again there was a request for Congressional aid, resulting in the passage of the
Webb-Kenyon Act which prohibited the shipment of liquor into a state in violation
:
7 FosICK AND Scorr, supra note i i9, at 25.
138 Bowman v. Chicago & N. W. R. R., 125 U. S. 495 (1888).
'
5 9 Leisy v. Hardin, x35 U. S. 1oo (1890). Cf. License Cases, 5 How. 504 (1847).
'"
0Dowling and Hubbard, Divesting an Article of its Interstate Character (1920) 5 MINN. L. REv.
100, 104. 14126 STAT. 313 (189o).
""In re Rahrer, 140 U. S. 545 (1895). 1' Rhodes v. Iowa, 170 U. S. 412 (1898).
144 Subsequent Supreme Court decisions further emasculated the Wilson Act: Vance v. Vandcrcock, 170
U. S. 438 (1898) (a state cannot compel a resident-consignee to certify to a state official the quantity
and kind of liquor to be imported; nor can it require the nonresident-consignor to attach a certificate to
the package); Heyman v. Southern R. R., 203 U. S. 270 (19o6) (a state's power over imported liquor does
not attach before the expiration of a reasonable time); Adams Express Co. v. Kentucky, 2o6 U. S. 129
(1907) (a state cannot prohibit C. 0. D. shipments of liquor). The decisions in all these cases rested on
a "construction" of the Wilson Act and the inability of a state unreasonably to interfere with interstate
commerce.
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of its laws.' 5 Violation of the Act was not made a federal offense; the legislation
merely divested intoxicating liquors of their interstate character, thereby subjecting
all shipments to state control as soon as they reached the state line. This statute thus
accomplished the prohibitionist objective of removing the protection of the commerce
clause from shipments of alcoholic beverages into a state in violation of its laws.1 46
But despite this legislation and other laws passed by Congress to aid dry states, 147
the prohibitionists continued to press for more drastic federal liquor legislation. In
1917, their efforts resulted in the passage of the Reed Amendment.148 This law pro-
vided that "whoever shall order, purchase or cause intoxicating liquors to be trans-
ported in interstate commerce" into any state the laws of which prohibit the manu-
facture or sale of intoxicating liquors should be fined and/or imprisoned.' 49 By its
terms, the Reed Amendment was applicable even though the state permitted liquors
to be imported for personal use. Thus the Amendment imposed a "bone-dry" policy
concerning interstate shipments of intoxicating liquors upon any state that prohibited
the manufacture or sale of intoxicants.' 49' National prohibition was one step nearer
to realization.
National Prohibition.
Shortly after the entry of the United States into World War I, Congress prohibited
the sale of liquor at any military station or enlisted men's club or to any member
of the military forces while in uniform and gave the President power to prohibit the
sale of alcoholic liquors in or near military camps and to members of the army. 50
Congress then passed the Food Control Act of August, 1917, which prohibited the
use of food materials or feeds in the production of distilled spirits for beverage pur-
1"' "The shipment or transportation... of any ... liquor of any kind, fron one State . . . into any
other State, ... which . .. liquor is intended .. . to be received, possessed, sold, or in any manner used,
either in the original package or otherwise, in violation of any law of such State ... is hereby prohibited."
37 STAT. 699 (1913).
"' Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland R. R., 242 U. S. 31 (1916); Seaboard Air Line R. R. v.
North Carolina, 245 U. S. 298 (917).
147 Four provisions enacted by Congress in i9o9 aided the dry cause: (i) intoxicating liquors were
declared to be nonmailable; (a) express companies and other common carriers were not to deliver
intoxicants to fictitious consignees; (3) they were not to deliver C. 0. D. liquor packages; and (4) all
packages containing liquors were to be so labeled as "to plainly show the name of the consignee, the
nature of its contents, and the quantity contained therein." 35 STAT. 1131, 1136-37.
1ts39 STAT. i069 (19,7), amended by 39 STAT. 1202 (1917), 40 STAT. 329 (1917), 40 STAT. 1151
(1919), 41 ST-T. 313 (1919), 48 STAT-. 316 (1934). Held constitutional in United States v. Hill, 248
U. S. 420 (i959). Repealed by 49 STAT. 1930 (1936). See Graves, The Reed "Bone-Dry" Amendment
(917) 4 VA. L. Rsv. 634; Russell, The States Did Not Fail in Liquor Control (1933) 23 Ky. L. J. 427.
14' It also provided that no advertisement of, or order for, intoxicating liquors should be desposited in,
or carried by, the mails when addressed to any person in a state, the laws of which made it unlawful to
advertise or solicit orders for such liquors; and provided for certain penalties if a publisher or dealer in
liquors should "knowingly" violate the provisions of this part of the Amendment.
"a See United States v. Collins, 254 Fed. 869 (NV. D. La. 1919); Rockwell, Federal Legislation After
Repeal (1933) 37 LAW NoMs 84, 86; Cushman, The National Police Power Under the Commerce Clause
of the Constitution (1919) 3 MINN. L. REv. 381, 409.
150 37 STAT. 82 (1917), amended by 40 STAT. 393 (917)- See President's Proclamation of June 27,
1918; Evans v. United States, 261 Fed. 103 (C. C. A. 2d, 1919) (as to the extent of the prohibited zone);
United States v. Kinsel, 263 Fed. 141 (N. D. Wash., 1918) (as to liquors prohibited).
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poses' 51 and the War Prohibition Act of November, 1918, which provided that after
June 30, igi9, until the termination of demobilization it should be illegal to sell in-
toxicating liquors.' 52 Finally, the adoption of the Eighteenth Amendment in
January, i919, made the federal policy of national prohibition supreme.
Many factors help to explain the adoption of the Amendment. Public opinion
was profoundly disturbed by the evils of the saloon (which were aggravated by the
tied-house system' 53) and the corrupt alliance between liquor and politics. In addi-
tion to these two major causes, there was the argument that by enforcing prohibition
the productivity of the nation would be enlarged, because workers would be more
efficient and the money theretofore spent for liquor would be invested in more pro-
ductive enterprises.:54 Business interests, convinced that sober employees would result
from the adoption of national prohibition, supported the dry crusade. 15 It was also
urged that wages would be increased and that standards of living would be raised.
Closely akin to the economic argument was the appeal to patriotism: that if the
Amendment were adopted, the grain, labor and capital theretofore used in the
brewing and distilling industries would be directed toward helping America win the
war.' 56
All these factors were skillfully exploited by the driving force against liquor, the
Anti-Saloon League. Congress acquiesced;' 57 so did a sufficient number of states.'5 s
The result was the Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution which prohibited the
manufacture, sale or transportation of intoxicating liquors. The unfortunate results
of this attempt at legal coercion are well known. The saloon was replaced by the
speakeasy which served adults and minors with impartiality. Instead of being able
to secure liquor made by an experienced distiller with a national or local reputation,
the average consumer was forced to accept "bath tub" gin, or alcohol that had been
"cut," colored, and flavored to resemble whisky. Bootleggers did a thriving business,
251 40 STAT. 276 (1917).
15 40 STAT. 1045 (i9i8), construed and held valid in Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries Co., 251
U. S. 146 (1gg). Cf. United States v. Standard Brewery, Inc., 251 U. S. 210 (1920). See also Ehrlich,
War-Time Prohibition (1919) 8 CAL.F. L. R V. 44-
..
3 See supra pp. 555-556.
.. But see WNaRunToN, TsE EcoNomic RusuTs op PRomwTION (1932) 26, concluding that "pro-
hibition has not been a fact of measurable significance in the increased industrial productivity of recent
years.,
1"' "The Rockefellers, S. S. Kresge, James N. Gamble, John Wanamaker, Joseph Boyer of the Bur-
roughs Adding Machine Company, James Horton Ice Cream Company, J. L. Hudson of the Hudson
Motor Company, R. E. Olds of the Reo Motor Company, S. S. Martin of the National Biscuit Company,
the United States Steel Corporation--all donated freely." And Henry Ford said, "The Eighteenth Amend-
ment is recognized by the men and women of our country, the women especially, as the greatest force for
the comfort and prosperity of the United States." Hacker, The Rise and Fall of Prohibition (932) 36
CuRR. HiSr. 662, 670.
1.. In addition there was the emotional appeal that "German brewers in this country have rendered
thousands of men inefficient and are thus crippling the Republic in its fight on Prussian militarism."
Quoted by Hacker, supra note 155, at 665. Thus the fight for prohibition was coalesced with the fight
against Germany.
1
""The Joint Resolution of Dec. 18, 1917, 40 STAT. 1050, proposed an Amendment to the Constitution
which later became the Eighteenth.
... On Jan. 29, x919, the Secretary of State proclaimed that on or before Jan. x6, the necessary 36
states had ratified the Amendment.
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charged high prices, paid their taxes in the form of protection money, and corrupted
local, state, and national officials.' 9 Thus the unholy alliance between liquor and
politics, one of the causes of Prohibition, returned in an aggravated form. With
political protection assured, the bootlegging element branched out into other criminal
activities, particularly into the fields of racketeering and gambling.
Law enforcement agencies failed to cope with the problem successfully.160 Many
factors explain this failure. Congress refused to establish an adequate enforcement
agency. It voted dry, but apparently was quite wet when it came to giving the Pro-
hibition Bureau adequate appropriations.' 6 ' Even with decent appropriations, it
would have been well-nigh impossible for the Federal Government to police the
liquor activities of its citizenry. There is a limit to effective federal action. This
weakness might possibly have been remedied by state assistance, but the states refused
to cooperate with the Federal Government in its attempt to enforce the law.162 In
no one year did the combined enforcement appropriations of the states equal one
million dollars.' 13 Courts, bogged down with a flood of liquor prosecutions, held
"bargain days" on which alleged violators could plead guilty and be assured of a
light fine or suspended sentence.' 64
The most important reason for the failure in enforcement is found in the attitude
of the public. Indeed, this attitude probably explains why state and federal govern-
ments failed to establish adequate enforcement agencies. People resented being
ordered by a Constitutional command not to indulge in even a glass of mildly
euphoric beer.165 They objected to the disregard of the law by the wealthy who were
able and willing to pay high prices in order to keep a well-stocked cellar. Law en-
forcement officials often used crude methods that stirred up opposition to them and
the law they represented.' 66 All this resulted in public apathy or opposition to
national prohibition and made effective enforcement practically impossible. With the
breakdown in law enforcement and the widespread violation of the laws that had
been enacted pursuant to the power granted in the Amendment, there arose a general
disregard for law and order. It is precisely here that Prohibition caused the most
havoc, for law and order, respect for authority, are basic to the well-being of any
government. The effort to eradicat6 the acknowledged evils of the pre-Prohibition
era resulted in the greater evil of disrespect for and violation of law.'0
"' Nat. Comm. on Law Obs. and Enf., op. cit. supra note 82, at 44.
3.0 id., 22 et seq. ... Hacker, supra note 155, at 666.
1. Maryland's attitude is illustrative: "In Maryland we decline to make the Volstead Act a law of the
state. . . . We simply say it is a federal law and not Maryland law, and it is no part of our duty as a
State to adopt it as our own and set up State machinery to carry it out. We leave its enforcement in our
State to the federal government which made it." Address by Gov. Albert Ritchie, Enforcement of the
Eighteenth Amendment and the Volstead Act, Aug. 14, 1929, quoted in Note (1938) 23 IowA L. Riv.
635, 645 n. 68. ... Hacker, supra note 155, at 669.
... Stevenson, Fallades of Volsteadism (r926) 25 LAw NorRs 211.
'orNArIoNALs Phommos Acr, 41 STAr. 305 (919) tit. II, §29, made all beverages containing one
half of one percent or more of alcohol by volume "intoxicating liquors."
30 Nat. Comm. on Law Obs. and Enf., op. cit. supra note 82, at 55 et seq. The material in this
paragraph is based upon that source.
1"7 Henry W. Anderson, a member of the so-called Wickersham Commission, (id. at go) listed the
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Such a situation could not long endure. Individuals not associated with the liquor
interests organized and headed associations against the continuance of national pro-
hibition. 68 Prominent leaders who had theretofore been noncommittal or active
supporters of the Amendment publicly announced their opposition.'0 9 A Literary
Digest poll in I93O indicated that the Amendment was very unpopular. 170 However,
many felt that the prosperity of the twenties was caused in part at least by Prohibition,
and Anti-Saloon League spokesmen played this theme at every opportunity.17 But
this prop was removed by the depression of the thirties. The wets, missing no
chances, publicized the theory that legalizing the liquor traffic would provide the
necessary impetus for economic recovery. Federal and state governments, their
budgets unbalanced by relief expenditures and decreased tax returns, looked anxiously
for new sources of revenue. Eventually these forces became sufficiently strong, and
on December 5, 1933, Utah, the thirty-sixth state, ratified the Twenty-first Amend-
ment:
Section i. The eighteenth article of amendment to the Constitution of the United States
is hereby repealed.
Section 2. The transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or possession of
the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors in violation of the laws
thereof, is hereby prohibited.
AT REPEAL
With the adoption of the Twenty-first Amendment, the states again became the
primary instruments of alcoholic beverage control, free to experiment with new control
systems or to return to pre-Prohibition plans. The Federal Government was to coop-
evils which he found resulted from the attempt to make "the entire population of the United States total
abstainers in disregard of the demand deeply rooted in the habits and customs of the people." He stated
in his separate statement:
"As a result [of Prohibition] we are confronted by new evils of far-reaching and disturbing con-
sequence. . . . The fruitless efforts at enforcement are creating public disregard not only for this law but
for all laws. Public corruption through the purchase of official protection for this illegal traffic is wide-
spread and notorious. The courts are cluttered with prohibition cases to an extent which seriously affects
the entire administration of justice. The prisons ... are overflowing... . Thd people are being poisoned
with bad and unregulated liquor. . . . The illicit producer, the bootlegger and the speakeasy are reaping
a rich harvest of profits. . . . The enormous revenues (estimated at from two tc three billion dollars per
annum) placed in the hands of the lawless and criminal elements of society through this illegal traffic are
not only enabling them to carry on this business, but to organize and develop other lines of criminal
activity to an extent which threatens social and economic security."
..
8 Pierre S. Du Pont headed the Association Against Prohibition; Mrs. Charles S. Sabin, the Women's
Organization for National Prohibition Reform.
' "John D. Rockefeller, Jr., regarded as the most prominent individual in the ranks of prohibition
supporters, one of the largest contributors to the Anti-Saloon League, and who witV his father subscribed
$350,000 to make possible the adoption of prohibition legislation, declared himself yesterday in favor of
repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment." Two days later Dr. John R. Mott, president of the Y. M. C. A.
declared himself in favor of resubmission of the question to the voters. N. Y. Times, June 7 and 9,
1932, p. 1.
170 2o,ooo,ooo ballots were distributed; over 4,000,000 were voted, 73.9 percent of which opposed
the Amendment.
""' This Anti-Saloon League declaration is illustrative: "Industry, commerce, art, literature, music, learn-
ing, entertainment, and benevolence find their finest expressions in this saloonless land." Quoted by Hacker,
supra note X55, at 67o.
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erate to the extent of protecting dry states from interstate or foreign importations
and regulating those phases of the traffic that could not effectively be controlled by
the states.172 Within this framework legislators were to evolve regulatory systems
that would avoid the errors of Prohibition and pre-Prohibition eras and thus con-
tribute a reasonably permanent solution to the problem which over two centuries of
legislation had failed to solve satisfactorily.
The first objective of post-Repeal liquor legislation should have been to abolish
lawlessness and restore respect for law and order.i7" The widespread disrespect for
the Prohibition Amendment and its implementing laws proved again that there is
a limit to effective legal action and that law must bear a reasonably close relation to
the mores of the community. Post-Repeal control systems then should have been
based upon the habits, customs, and desires of the persons regulated. Local option,
provision for personal importation in dry states, and an intelligent educational pro-
gram are all desirable expedients. Also, because the bootlegger was so strongly
entrenched at the time of Repeal, governments should have made inexpensive legal
liquor so easily obtainable that the illegal seller could not compete, thereby destroying
his insidious power. This could have been done by imposing low fees and taxes
during the first years after Repeal. Social and not revenue considerations should
determine liquor-taxing policies.174
The second important aim should have been to encourage temperance and mod-
eration in the consumption of alcoholic beverages. This could best, and perhaps only,
be accomplished through a long-range process of education. But education is a slow
procedure and there were supplementary devices that could have been utilized
immediately. Chief among these was the state monopoly plan under which the state
would be the sole retailer of intoxicating beverages. Liquors would be fairly easily
obtained by those who wished to drink, but the motive of private profit in retail sales
having been eliminated, there would be no stimulation of sales. Certainly this plan
offered the most hope for avoiding pre-Prohibition abuses and it was the one recom-
mended by the Rockefeller committee. 75 But if a state rejected the monopoly plan,
temperance and moderation could still have been fostered by subjecting the sale of
light wines and beers to little restraint and by so taxing those liquors as to make them
'The 1932 platforms of both major parties contained planks urging protection for dry states. The
same thought was expressed in Congress during the debate on the way in which an amendment should
be phrased. 70 CONG. REc. I07o et seq. (1933). See also the testimony of Mr. Joseph H. Choate, Jr., before
the Ways and Means Committee, "Now of course, another tremendous part of the obligation of the govern-
ment is to do what has to be done in order to enforce the twenty-first amendment itself." Mr. Choate who
was Administrator of the Federal Alcohol Control Administration, also stated that the United States should
"do for those states and for the people at large those things which no single state could do." Hearings
before Committee on Ways and Means on H. R. 8539, 7 4 th Cong., ist Sess. (1935) 9-10.
... FososcK AND Sco'rr, TowArd LiQuoR CONTROL (1933) 15. This work was the result of a thorough
study of the liquor problem undertaken by Messrs. Fosdick and Scott at the request of Mr. John D.
Rockefeller, Jr. The authors were aided by a large research staff, among them, Mr. Leonard V. Harrison
and Miss Elizabeth Laine who later wrote the book, After Repeal. Toward Liquor Control has been an
invaluable aid in the preparation of this paper and it is a pleasure to acknowledge here my indebtedness.
14 Cf. Studenski, The Taxation of Liquor (1936) 14 TAX MAo. 8.
17 Supra note 173.
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comparatively inexpensive. The latter could have been accomplished by the applica-
tion of Professor Yandell Henderson's "principle of dilution." According to this
theory, liquor taxes should be levied upon the alcohol contained in the beverage and
the alcohol in diluted beverages (in which the percentage of alcohol is relatively
small) should be taxed at a much lower rate than the alcohol in concentrated bever-
ages.176 Temperance might also have been furthered by limiting sales for on-premise
consumption to bona fide restaurants and by requiring that drinks only be sold with
meals.1 77 However the obvious difficulty of enforcing the latter requirement strongly
suggests that it not be adopted. Lastly, the temperance cause should have been
advanced by subjecting alcoholic beverage advertising to rigorous control.
Third, the old saloon could not be permitted to return. Legislation against the
tied-house in any of its forms was in order, and the location and character of estab-
lishments where liquor was to be sold should have been strictly regulated. The old
pre-Prohibition regulations concerning the number of outlets, their location, persons
to whom liquor could not be served, hours and days of sale, sales on credit, and
similar restrictions might profitably have been supplemented by requirements de-
signed to improve the appearance of places where liquor was to be sold.
Fourth, the consumer interest in being protected from deception and in securing
a pure product at the lowest possible price pressed for recognition. Labeling and
advertising practices as well as manufacturing processes and oligopolistic tendencies
required supervision and regulation; and suitable legislation to meet these needs
should have been enacted. These functions might have been allocated to existing
agencies such as the Food and Drugs Administration, the Federal Trade Commis-
sion, the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and the Anti-Trust Division of the Department
of Justice, but that would involve a division of responsibility and often result in a
duplication of investigatory and enforcement procedures, expensive to both the
industry and government."' 8 Avoidance of these consequences would seem sufficient
reason for establishing a single administrative agency to regulate all phases of the
liquor traffic.
It should also be noted that at the time of Repeal, the liquor industry was a new
business. Governments did not have to worry about shifting existing patterns or
interfering with allegedly "vested" interests. Transitional difficulties which so often
thwart a program of social reform were absent or negligible. It is much easier to
prevent oligopoly than it is to atomize huge industrial units after oligopoly has be-
come entrenched. The very fact that the liquor industry had a record of price fixing
and restriction of production by agreement should have induced governments to act
quickly and firmly against the danger of monopolistic practices.
Fifth, so far as possible the liquor question should have been eliminated as a
"a HENDEmsoN, A NEw DEA. iN LiQuo (934).
" See Sheppard, After Five Years, What Has Repeal Achieved?, N. Y. Times Mag., Dec. 4, 1938,
p. 5.
.. Handler, The Control of False Advertisng Under the Wheeler-Lea Act (x939) 6 LAw AND CON-
'rEMP. PROB. 91, 108.
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political issue and the corruptive political influence of the liquor interests should
have been forestalled. These objectives could have been most easily achieved by
establishing a central administrative agency, delegating to it adequate powers, staffing
it with capable personnel, freeing it from political pressures, and supplying it with
ample funds. This would have removed the liquor question from the legislative and
public forum where it had too long been the center of attention and placed it in the
hands of an expert administrative tribunal, free to devote its time and energies to
liquor control. It would also have prevented in large measure a recurrence of the
insidious political influence exerted by the liquor trade, particularly if the administra-
tive body were a state agency and therefore free to disregard the pressures of local
political leaders. Also, cooperation concerning liquor regulation between the various
states and the Federal Government would be facilitated by vesting the administration
of control legislation in administrative tribunals.
Finally, because any permanent liquor reform must involve a program of public
education, which presupposes the existence of a body of information worthy of com-
municating to the public, and because sound liquor legislation presupposes an in-
formed law-making body, there should have been established some agency or
agencies to engage in a program of research for ascertaining the facts concerning
liquor and liquor control. Inasmuch as most private agencies would be subject to
the charge of bias and probably would not carry on a sustained program of research,
the task devolved upon government.
Legislation embodying these suggestions would have represented real and sig-
nificant progress in the field of alcoholic beverage control. But the liquor problem
cannot be solved by a statute, however wisely designed and however soundly ad-
ministered. Goodness cannot be legislated into men. Temperance, moderation,
self-control-these must be the bases of any lasting reform.
